FILOSOFÍA DE LAS MATEM ÁTICAS,TEORÍA DE CARDINALES GRANDES Y SUS BASES COGNITIVAS.
In this paper we examine in first place some philosophical implications of P. Maddy's mathematical naturalism as a philosophical account which allows us to overcome the drawbacks associated to both fictionalism and physicalistic realism in philosophy of mathematics. Besides that, the main virtue of...
| Publicado en: | Revista de Filosofía (00348236) Vol. 73; pp. 281 - 298 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Universidad de Chile
2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=127134445&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 127134445 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00348236 2EMA jtl: Revista de Filosofía (00348236) issn: 00348236 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2017 vid: 73 pid: 30789 pub: Universidad de Chile artinfo: ui: 127134445 10.4067/s0718-43602017000100281 ppf: 281 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 3.2MB tig: atl: FILOSOFÍA DE LAS MATEM ÁTICAS,TEORÍA DE CARDINALES GRANDES Y SUS BASES COGNITIVAS. aug: au: Quezada, Wilfredo affil: Universidad de Santiago de Chile sug: keyword: constructible set embodied cognition large cardinals mathematical naturalism set theory cardinales grandes cognición corporeizada conjunto construible naturalismo matemático teoría de conjuntos ab: In this paper we examine in first place some philosophical implications of P. Maddy's mathematical naturalism as a philosophical account which allows us to overcome the drawbacks associated to both fictionalism and physicalistic realism in philosophy of mathematics. Besides that, the main virtue of that account seems to lie in the solution it provides to the applicability of mathematics problem when rejecting both the indispensability thesis and confirmative holism postulated by Quine. In second place, on the basis of difficulties intrinsic to Maddy's philosophical program, we explore a better motivated naturalistic option -the embodied cognition approach- and suggest that it allows to adequately explain why most of set-theory specialists use to postulate the existence of some large cardinals, in particular, non-constructible sets. En este artículo se examinan algunas implicaciones del naturalismo matemático de P. Maddy como una concepción filosófica que permite superar las dificultades del ficcionalismo y el realismo fisicalista en matemáticas. Aparte de esto, la mayor virtud de tal concepción parece ser que resuelve el problema que plantea para la aplicabilidad de la matemática el no asumir la tesis de indispensabilidad de Quine sin comprometerse con su holismo confirmacional. A continuación, sobre la base de dificultades intrínsecas al programa de Maddy, exploramos un camino naturalista mejor motivado, el enfoque cognitivista corporeizado, y sugerimos que él permite explicar de manera adecuada la postulación de ciertos cardinales grandes, en particular, la aceptación de conjuntos no-construibles. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: Spanish refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Revista de Filosofía (00348236) is the property of Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Revista de Filosofía (00348236) holder: Universidad de Chile, Facultad de Filosofia y Humanidades dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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