Liar Liar: Experimental Evidence of the Effect of Confirmation‐Reports on Dishonesty.

We identify the effect of confirmation‐reports on dishonesty using data from an experiment where subjects are asked to roll a die and report its outcome using either a self‐report or confirmation‐report mechanism. We find that relative to self‐reports, confirmation‐reports have a positive effect on...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Southern Economic Journal Vol. 84; no. 3; pp. 742 - 771
Autores principales: Duncan, Denvil, Li, Danyang
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jan2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Liar Liar: Experimental Evidence of the Effect of Confirmation‐Reports on Dishonesty.
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          Duncan, Denvil
          Li, Danyang
      su:
        Bribery
        Markets
        Honesty
        Income tax
        Accuracy
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        subj:
          Bribery
          Markets
          Honesty
          Income tax
          Accuracy
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      ab: We identify the effect of confirmation‐reports on dishonesty using data from an experiment where subjects are asked to roll a die and report its outcome using either a self‐report or confirmation‐report mechanism. We find that relative to self‐reports, confirmation‐reports have a positive effect on the share of subjects who report honestly. The effect on the magnitude of lies told depends greatly on the accuracy of the prefilled information on the confirmation‐report. We argue that these results are driven by changes in the intrinsic costs of lying induced by the confirmation report.
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    language: English
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