Inductive Risk and Regulatory Toxicology: A Comment on de Melo-Martín and Intemann.
Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductive risk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the "core" of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 85; no. 1; pp. 164 - 175 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=127217745&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 127217745 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2018 vid: 85 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 127217745 10.1086/694771 ppf: 164 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 225KB tig: atl: Inductive Risk and Regulatory Toxicology: A Comment on de Melo-Martín and Intemann. aug: au: Hicks, Daniel J. su: Reasoning Ethics Toxicology Risk Pragmatics sug: subj: Reasoning Ethics Toxicology Risk Pragmatics ab: Inmaculada de Melo-Martín and Kristen Intemann consider whether, from the perspective of the argument from inductive risk, ethical and political values might be logically, epistemically, pragmatically, or ethically necessary in the "core" of scientific reasoning. In each case, they argue that there are significant conceptual problems. In this comment, employing regulatory uses of high-throughput toxicology at the US Environmental Protection Agency as a case study, I respond to some of their claims about the notion of "pragmatic necessity." I conclude that, while an inductive risk framework has some significant limitations, it is still conceptually and rhetorically valuable. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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