FUNCTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF OCCURRENT STATES.
In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 68; no. 270; pp. 1 - 21 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jan2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=127338773&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 127338773 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2018 vid: 68 iid: 270 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 127338773 10.1093/pq/pqx043 ppf: 1 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 595KB tig: atl: FUNCTIONALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF OCCURRENT STATES. aug: au: Bartlett, Gary affil: Central Washington University, USA su: Consciousness Place, Ullin Thomas Disposition (Philosophy) Individuation (Philosophy) Brain function localization sug: subj: Consciousness Place, Ullin Thomas Disposition (Philosophy) Individuation (Philosophy) Brain function localization keyword: conscious experience functionalism occurrent states process U. T. Place ab: In 1956 U. T. Place proposed that consciousness is a brain process. More attention should be paid to his word 'process'. There is near-universal agreement that experiences are processive--as witnessed in the platitude that experiences are occurrent states. The abandonment of talk of brain processes has benefited functionalism, because a functional state, as it is usually conceived, cannot be a process. This point is dimly recognized in a well-known but little-discussed argument that conscious experiences cannot be functional states because the former are occurrent, while the latter are dispositional. That argument fails, but it can be made sound if we reformulate it with the premise that occurrent states are processive. The only way for functionalists to meet the resulting challenge is to abandon the standard individuation of functional states in terms of purely abstract causal roles. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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