Peaceful Uncertainty: When Power Shocks Do Not Create Commitment Problems.
Does a shock to the balance of power cause the advantaged actor to exploit its newfound advantage by initiating conflict? The modeling literature on commitment problems as a source of war makes a central assumption that states know and anticipate power shifts. We relax this assumption such that stat...
| Publicado en: | International Studies Quarterly Vol. 61; no. 4; pp. 850 - 867 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Dec2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127607748&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127607748 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00208833 ISQ jtl: International Studies Quarterly issn: 00208833 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2017 vid: 61 iid: 4 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 127607748 10.1093/isq/sqx041 ppf: 850 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P db: hlh ui: 127607748 tig: atl: Peaceful Uncertainty: When Power Shocks Do Not Create Commitment Problems. aug: au: BAS, MUHAMMET A. SCHUB, ROBERT affil: New York University, Abu Dhabi University of Nebraska-Lincoln su: Balance of power Uncertainty Negotiation Peace Causes of war sug: subj: Balance of power Uncertainty Negotiation Peace Causes of war ab: Does a shock to the balance of power cause the advantaged actor to exploit its newfound advantage by initiating conflict? The modeling literature on commitment problems as a source of war makes a central assumption that states know and anticipate power shifts. We relax this assumption such that states must estimate future power shifts by looking at past and present capabilities-both their own and those of their adversaries. We incorporate these estimates, and their attendant uncertainty, into a model of war. We find that commitment problems remain a source of war, but that the existing models overpredict war by ignoring this dynamic. States continuously updating their estimates and accounting for uncertainty promotes peace. It follows that the apparent window of opportunity-in which the power balance becomes suddenly favorable to one side- poses less of a threat to peace than previous theories suggest. This result has applications to nuclear proliferation dynamics and conflict in general. We find empirical support for the model in tests analyzing power shifts and interstate wars. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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