Middlemen: the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Abstract: We examine the role of a middleman as an expert in markets. A seller's effort determines the quality of the good. Buyers observe neither the seller's effort nor the good's quality. A middleman, after observing a signal about the good's quality, decides whether to purchase it and then to se...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 3 - 23 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127932156&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127932156 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2018 vid: 49 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 127932156 10.1111/1756-2171.12216 ppf: 3 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 279KB tig: atl: Middlemen: the good, the bad, and the ugly. aug: au: Biglaiser, Gary Li, Fei affil: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill su: Goldman Sachs & Co. Homeowners Social services Distributors (Commerce) Bargaining power sug: subj: Homeowners Social services Goldman Sachs & Co. All other merchant wholesalers Other Individual and Family Services Distributors (Commerce) Bargaining power ab: Abstract: We examine the role of a middleman as an expert in markets. A seller's effort determines the quality of the good. Buyers observe neither the seller's effort nor the good's quality. A middleman, after observing a signal about the good's quality, decides whether to purchase it and then to sell it. We show that the presence of a middleman may either reduce or exacerbate the seller's moral hazard problem. We also consider a model with multiple middlemen. We find that the seller's effort is minimized if either the middleman's signal is perfect or the number of middlemen is large. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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