Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions.
Abstract: We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus de...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 1; pp. 87 - 128 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Spring2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=127932161&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 127932161 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Spring2018 vid: 49 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 127932161 10.1111/1756-2171.12221 ppf: 87 ppct: 41 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 3.2MB tig: atl: Complements and substitutes in sequential auctions: the case of water auctions. aug: au: Donna, Javier D. Espín‐Sánchez, José‐Antonio affil: The Ohio State University Yale University su: Economic demand Weather Multivariate analysis Agricultural productivity Structural equation modeling sug: subj: Economic demand Weather Multivariate analysis Agricultural productivity Structural equation modeling ab: Abstract: We use data on sequential water auctions to estimate demand when units are complements or substitutes. A sequential English auction model determines the estimating structural equations. When units are complements, one bidder wins all units by paying a high price for the first unit, thus deterring others from bidding on subsequent units. When units are substitutes, different bidders win the units with positive probability, paying prices similar in magnitude. We recover individual demand consistent with this stark pattern of outcomes and confirm it is not collusive but consistent with noncooperative behavior. Demand estimates are biased if one ignores these features. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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