HORIZONTAL MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS.

We examine a merger between two competitors in a Bertrand‐Edgeworth model. We find that the effects of merger depend on the tightness of capacity constraints. The combination of two firms has no price effect if and only if the capacity constraints of all firms are binding both before and after the m...

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Detalles Bibliográficos

Publicado en:	Economic Inquiry Vol. 56; no. 2; pp. 1346 - 1357
Autores principales:	Chen, Zhiqi, Li, Gang
Formato:	Artículo
Publicado:	Wiley-Blackwell Apr2018
Materias:	Computer simulation Microeconomics Economic competition Mergers & acquisitions Consumers' surplus
Acceso en línea:	Ver este registro en EBSCOhost