Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts.
Abstract: This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role theory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well‐placed to explain both the irreducibility and practicality of moral concepts. Several versions of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts are disti...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26; no. 1; pp. 95 - 122 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=128376430&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 128376430 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2018 vid: 26 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 128376430 10.1111/ejop.12191 ppf: 95 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 232KB tig: atl: Conceptual Role Semantics and the Reference of Moral Concepts. aug: au: Sinclair, Neil affil: University of Nottingham, UK su: Moral agent (Philosophy) Semantics Philosophical analysis Irreducibility (Philosophy) Cognitive psychology sug: subj: Moral agent (Philosophy) Semantics Philosophical analysis Irreducibility (Philosophy) Cognitive psychology ab: Abstract: This paper examines the prospects for a conceptual or functional role theory of moral concepts. It is argued that such an account is well‐placed to explain both the irreducibility and practicality of moral concepts. Several versions of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts are distinguished, depending on whether the concept‐constitutive conceptual roles are (i) wide or narrow (ii) normative or non‐normative and (iii) purely doxastic or conative. It is argued that the most plausible version of conceptual role semantics for moral concepts involves only ‘narrow’ conceptual roles, where these include connections to motivational, desire‐like, states. In the penultimate section it is argued, contrary to what Wedgwood, Enoch and others have claimed, that such an account of moral concepts cannot plausibly be combined with the claim that moral concepts refer to robust properties. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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