Deweyan Democracy, Robert Talisse, and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism.
Over the last decade, Robert Talisse has developed a devastating argument against reviving John Dewey's democratic ideal. In his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, and in other essays, Talisse has argued that Deweyan democracy fails to accommodate Rawls' conception of 'the fact of reasonabl...
| Publicado en: | Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society Vol. 53; no. 4; pp. 553 - 579 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Indiana University Press
Fall2017
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=128457190&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 128457190 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00091774 2HR jtl: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society issn: 00091774 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Fall2017 vid: 53 iid: 4 pid: 211 pub: Indiana University Press artinfo: ui: 128457190 10.2979/trancharpeirsoc.53.4.03 ppf: 553 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 576KB tig: atl: Deweyan Democracy, Robert Talisse, and the Fact of Reasonable Pluralism. aug: au: Forstenzer, Joshua affil: University of Sheffield su: Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, A (Book) Dewey, John, 1859-1952 Talisse, Robert Pluralism Perfection Ralston, Shane sug: subj: Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, A (Book) Dewey, John, 1859-1952 Talisse, Robert Pluralism Perfection Ralston, Shane keyword: Democracy Dewey Growth Perfectionism Ralston Rawls Reasonable Pluralism Talisse ab: Over the last decade, Robert Talisse has developed a devastating argument against reviving John Dewey's democratic ideal. In his book, A Pragmatist Philosophy of Democracy, and in other essays, Talisse has argued that Deweyan democracy fails to accommodate Rawls' conception of 'the fact of reasonable pluralism' because it is committed to a perfectionist conception of the good. In response, this article offers a Rawlsian rebuttal to Talisse by drawing on Rawls' own characterisation of perfectionism to show that Dewey's conception of the good is not perfectionist on Rawls' account and thus can reasonably accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism. This article thus begins by exposing and explaining Talisse's argument, before articulating Shane Ralston's rejection of the Berlinian and Rawlsian filters presupposed by Talisse's argument. Then, it develops its central argument by showing that, even if we accept the Rawlsian filter, Deweyan democracy does not fail to accommodate the fact of reasonable pluralism, because it only relies on a thin (not a full) theory of the good, before considering some foreseeable Talissean objections. Ultimately, the article concludes by showing that these objections fail because Deweyan democracy does not rely on a 'full' theory of the good. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society is the property of Indiana University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society holder: Indiana University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2017 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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