Intervening on structure.

Some explanations appeal to facts about the causal structure of a system in order to shed light on a particular phenomenon; these are explanations which do more than cite the causes <italic>X</italic> and <italic>Y</italic> of some state-of-affairs <italic>Z</italic>, but rather appeal to “macro-lev...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 195; no. 5; pp. 2295 - 2313
Autor principal: Malinsky, Daniel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Intervening on structure.
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        au: Malinsky, Daniel
        affil: Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, 15206, Pittsburgh, PA, USA
      su:
        Operant behavior
        Biological research
        Causation (Philosophy)
        Metaphysics
        Explanation
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        subj:
          Operant behavior
          Biological research
          Causation (Philosophy)
          Metaphysics
          Explanation
      keyword:
        Causation
        Counterfactuals
        Intervention
      ab: Some explanations appeal to facts about the causal structure of a system in order to shed light on a particular phenomenon; these are explanations which do more than cite the causes <italic>X</italic> and <italic>Y</italic> of some state-of-affairs <italic>Z</italic>, but rather appeal to “macro-level” causal features—for example the fact that <italic>A</italic> causes <italic>B</italic> as well as <italic>C</italic>, or perhaps that <italic>D</italic> is a strong inhibitor of <italic>E</italic>—in order to explain <italic>Z</italic>. Appeals to these kinds of “macro-level” causal features appear in a wide variety of social scientific and biological research; statements about features such as “patriarchy,” “healthcare infrastructure,” and “functioning DNA repair mechanism,” for instance, can be understood as claims about what would be different (with respect to some target phenomenon) in a system with a different causal structure. I suggest interpreting counterfactual questions involving structural features as questions about alternative parameter settings of causal models, and propose an extension of the usual interventionist framework for causal explanation which enables scientists to explore the consequences of interventions on “macro-level” structure.
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    language: English
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