Dominic of Flanders’ Critique of John Duns Scotus’ Primary Argument for the Univocity of Being.
This article considers the attempt by a prominent fifteenth-century follower of Thomas Aquinas, Dominic of Flanders (a.k.a. Flandrensis, 1425-1479), to address John Duns Scotus’ most famous argument for the univocity of being. According to Scotus, the intellect must have a concept of being that is u...
| Publicado en: | Vivarium Vol. 56; no. 1/2; pp. 176 - 200 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129077173&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129077173 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00427543 C6F jtl: Vivarium issn: 00427543 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: 2018 vid: 56 iid: 1/2 pid: 639 pub: Brill Academic Publishers artinfo: ui: 129077173 10.1163/15685349-12341352 ppf: 176 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 774KB tig: atl: Dominic of Flanders’ Critique of John Duns Scotus’ Primary Argument for the Univocity of Being. aug: au: D’Ettore, Domenic affil: Marian University, Indianapolis, USA su: Duns Scotus, John, ca. 1266-1308 Thomism Scotism Analogy sug: subj: Duns Scotus, John, ca. 1266-1308 Thomism Scotism Analogy keyword: analogy Dominic of Flanders (Flandrensis) John Duns Scotus metaphysics univocity ab: This article considers the attempt by a prominent fifteenth-century follower of Thomas Aquinas, Dominic of Flanders (a.k.a. Flandrensis, 1425-1479), to address John Duns Scotus’ most famous argument for the univocity of being. According to Scotus, the intellect must have a concept of being that is univocal to substantial and accidental being, and to finite and infinite being, on the grounds that an intellect cannot be both certain and doubtful through the same concept, but an intellect can be certain that something is a being while doubting whether it is a substance or accident, finite or infinite. The article shows how Flandrensis’ reply in defence of analogy of being hinges on a more fundamental disagreement with Scotus over the division of the logically one. It also shows how Flandrensis’ answer to this question commits him to a position on the unity of the concept of being that lies between the positions of Scotus and of Flandrensis’ earlier Thomistic sources. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Vivarium is the property of Brill Academic Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Vivarium holder: Brill Academic Publishers dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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