ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO BARBARAS.
The paper deals with the problem of the "two Barbaras" in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic. The problem consists in Aristotle's differing views on two at a first sight similar in nature syllogisms of mixed assertoric (X) and necessary (L) premises: Barbara LXL and Barbara XLL. The fact that Aristo...
| Publicado en: | Problems / Problemos Vol. 93; pp. 90 - 102 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Vilnius University
2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129358678&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129358678 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13921126 3D4C jtl: Problems / Problemos issn: 13921126 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: 2018 vid: 93 pid: 16037 pub: Vilnius University artinfo: ui: 129358678 10.15388/Problemos.2018.93.11754 ppf: 90 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 2.5MB tig: atl: ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO BARBARAS. aug: au: Pabijutaitė, Živilė affil: Institute of Philosophy Vilnius University Universiteto str. 9/1, LT-01513 su: Syllogism Modal logic Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. Reasoning Ancient logic sug: subj: Syllogism Modal logic Aristotle, 384-322 B.C. Reasoning Ancient logic keyword: de dicto modal syllogistic term logic modalinė silogistika terminų logika ab: The paper deals with the problem of the "two Barbaras" in the Aristotelian modal syllogistic. The problem consists in Aristotle's differing views on two at a first sight similar in nature syllogisms of mixed assertoric (X) and necessary (L) premises: Barbara LXL and Barbara XLL. The fact that Aristotle believed the first syllogism to be valid and the second one - not, has been received either 1) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be invalid, or 2) negatively, because both Barbaras have been held to be valid, or 3) positively, by giving a reason why the two Barbaras differ. We commit ourselves to the position (3) by proving that modal propositions for Aristotle have their modalities de dicto and that Aristotelian modal operators act according to their own separate rules where only the type of the modality of a major premise is relevant for the modal status of the conclusion. Straipsnio objektas - "Dviejų Barbarų" problema, kylanti Aristotelio modalinėje silogistikoje. Šios problemos esmė - tai klausimas, ar ir kokiais principais remiantis galima paaiškinti besiskiriantį Aristotelio požiūrį į du savo forma panašius silogizmus, sudarytus iš asertorinių (X) ir būtinų (L) teiginių - Barbarą LXL ir Barbarą XLL. Tai, jog Aristotelis laikė pirmąjį samprotavimą pagrįstu, o antrąjį - ne, buvo vertinama skirtingai: 1) neigiamai, nes manyta, jog abi Barbaros yra nepagrįsti samprotavimai; 2) neigiamai, nes abi Barbaros laikytos pagrįstais samprotavimais; 3) teigiamai, nurodant priežastį, kodėl šie samprotavimai skiriasi. Parodant, jog galimumo ir būtinumo operatoriai Aristotelio modalinėje silogistikoje turi būti interpretuojami de dicto bei paklūsta išvedimo taisyklėms, kuriose lemiamą reikšmę turi didžiosios prielaidos modalumas, straipsnyje ginama (3) pozicija. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Problems / Problemos is the property of Vilnius University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Problems / Problemos holder: Vilnius University dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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