False advertising.
Abstract: There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policy maker can punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers and analyze the...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 348 - 370 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=129409920&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 129409920 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2018 vid: 49 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129409920 10.1111/1756-2171.12228 ppf: 348 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 245KB tig: atl: False advertising. aug: au: Rhodes, Andrew Wilson, Chris M. affil: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole Loughborough University su: Business ethics Commerce False advertising Corrupt practices in marketing Commercial policy Commercial products sug: subj: Business ethics Commerce Administration of General Economic Programs Commodity Contracts Dealing Commodity Contracts Brokerage False advertising Corrupt practices in marketing Commercial policy Commercial products ab: Abstract: There is widespread evidence that some firms use false advertising to overstate the value of their products. We consider a model in which a policy maker can punish such false claims. We characterize an equilibrium where false advertising actively influences rational buyers and analyze the effects of policy under different welfare objectives. We establish precise conditions where policy optimally permits a positive level of false advertising and show how these conditions vary intuitively with demand and market parameters. We also consider the implications for product investment and industry self‐regulation and connect our results to the literature on demand curvature. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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