Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information.
Abstract: A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A “virtual Hotelling rule” describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 2; pp. 311 - 348 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Summer2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=129409925&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 129409925 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Summer2018 vid: 49 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129409925 10.1111/1756-2171.12233 ppf: 311 ppct: 37 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 385KB tig: atl: Extracting information or resource? The Hotelling rule revisited under asymmetric information. aug: au: Martimort, David Pouyet, Jérôme Ricci, Francesco affil: Paris School of Economics‐EHESS THEMA‐CNRS, ESSEC Business School, Université de Cergy‐Pontoise Université de Montpellier (ART‐Dev) su: Resource exploitation Concessions (Administrative law) Municipal franchises Mining leases Royalties trading sug: subj: Resource exploitation Construction, Mining, and Forestry Machinery and Equipment Rental and Leasing Lessors of Other Real Estate Property Miscellaneous Intermediation Concessions (Administrative law) Municipal franchises Mining leases Royalties trading ab: Abstract: A concessionaire has private information on the initial stock of resource. A “virtual Hotelling rule” describes how the resource price evolves over time and how extraction costs are compounded with information costs along the optimal extraction path. Fields which are heterogeneous in terms of their initial stocks follow different extraction paths. Resource might be left unexploited in the long run as a way to foster incentives. The optimal contract may sometimes be implemented through royalties and license fees. With a market of concessionaires, asymmetric information leads to a “virtual Herfindahl principle” and to another form of heterogeneity across active concessionaires. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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