Cyberattacks as Casus Belli: A Sovereignty‐Based Account.
Abstract: Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 35; no. 2; pp. 222 - 242 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
May2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129410112&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129410112 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: May2018 vid: 35 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129410112 10.1111/japp.12169 ppf: 222 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 535KB tig: atl: Cyberattacks as Casus Belli: A Sovereignty‐Based Account. aug: au: Smith, Patrick Taylor affil: Department of Political Science and Global Studies Programme, National University Singapore, AS1, #04‐10, 11 Arts Link, Singapore, 117570 su: Cyberterrorism Information warfare Defensive (Military science) Military strategy Sovereignty sug: subj: Cyberterrorism Information warfare Defensive (Military science) Military strategy Sovereignty ab: Abstract: Since cyberattacks are nonphysical, standard theories of casus belli — which typically rely on the violent and forceful nature of military means — appear inapplicable. Yet, some theorists have argued that cyberattacks nonetheless can constitute just causes for war — generating a unilateral right to defensive military action — when they cause significant physical damage through the disruption of the target's computer systems. I show that this view suffers from a serious drawback: it is too permissive concerning the types of actions that generate casus belli since many essentially peaceful and non‐violent mechanisms can nonetheless cause physical damage. I resolve this difficulty by developing a sovereignty‐based account of casus belli and applying it to cyberwarfare. I argue that legitimate states have a constrained right to unilaterally respond with military force to unfriendly actions that bypass or overwhelm the political deliberations of the target state in order to force a change in behaviour contrary to the determinations of the people of the target state. This new account of casus belli avoids the problems of the consequence‐based view by plausibly restricting the types of unfriendly action that give rise to casus belli and yet offers an attractive explanation for why some cyberattacks nonetheless do generate a potential right to a unilateral defensive response. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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