Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem.
Abstract: Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed...
| Publicado en: | Ratio Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 137 - 155 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129453054&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129453054 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00340006 D8S jtl: Ratio issn: 00340006 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2018 vid: 31 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129453054 10.1111/rati.12166 ppf: 137 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 189KB tig: atl: Can Subjects Be Proper Parts of Subjects? The De‐Combination Problem. aug: au: Miller, Gregory affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Liverpool, Mulberry Court, Liverpool, L69 7ZY su: Panpsychism Theory of knowledge Philosophers Metaphysics Thought & thinking sug: subj: Panpsychism Theory of knowledge Philosophers Metaphysics Thought & thinking ab: Abstract: Growing concern with the panpsychist's ostensive inability to solve the ‘combination problem’ has led some authors to adopt a view titled ‘Cosmopsychism’. This position turns panpsychism on its head: rather than many tiny atomic minds, there is instead one cosmos‐sized mind. It is supposed that this view voids the combination problem, however I argue that it does not. I argue that there is a ‘de‐combination problem’ facing the cosmopsychist, which is equivalent to the combination problem as they are both concerned with subjects being proper parts of other subjects. I then propose two methods for both theorists to avoid the problem of subject‐subject proper parthood relations: a distinction between absolute and relative phenomenal unity, and a modification of the essential nature of subjects. Of these two options, I find the latter option wanting and propose that the first should be adopted. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Ratio is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Ratio holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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