On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis.
In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cognitive argument for cost-be...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 21; no. 2; pp. 217 - 231 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129595087&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129595087 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2018 vid: 21 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 129595087 10.1007/s10677-018-9883-9 ppf: 217 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 449KB tig: atl: On the Cognitive Argument for Cost-Benefit Analysis. aug: au: Christiansen, Andreas affil: Department of Media, Cognition and Communication, University of Copenhagen, KUA2, Building 16-1-24, 2300, Copenhagen S, Denmark su: Cognition Cost effectiveness Decision making Theory of knowledge Critical thinking sug: subj: Cognition Cost effectiveness Decision making Theory of knowledge Critical thinking keyword: Cass Sunstein Cognitive bias Cost-benefit analysis Ethics Risk ab: In a number of writings, Cass Sunstein has argued that we should use cost-benefit analysis as our primary approach to risk management, because cost-benefit analysis corrects for the cognitive biases that mar our thinking about risk. The paper critically evaluates this ‘cognitive argument for cost-benefit analysis’ and finds it wanting. Once we make distinctions between different cognitive errors and between different aspects of cost-benefit analysis, it becomes apparent that there are really two cognitive arguments, neither of which is successful as arguments for cost-benefit analysis as a whole. One argument shows that the analysis aspect of cost-benefit analysis is warranted because it corrects for false beliefs about the magnitudes of risk and for the neglect of some costs. While this is a sound argument, it does not provide an argument for other aspects of cost-benefit analysis. The second argument purports to show that commensurating and monetizing the values of the effects of regulation is warranted because it corrects for the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life. This argument fails because the use of widely diverging values of a statistical life is not a cognitive error: It is neither precluded by considerations of instrumental rationality, nor by the requirement of treating like cases alike. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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