The Moral Agency of Group Agents.
Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently developed a model of group agency on which an autonomous group agent can be formed, by deductive inference, from the beliefs and preferences of the individual group members. In this paper I raise doubts as to whether this type of group agent is a moral...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 83; no. 3; pp. 517 - 539 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=129628612&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 129628612 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2018 vid: 83 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 129628612 10.1007/s10670-017-9901-7 ppf: 517 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 456KB tig: atl: The Moral Agency of Group Agents. aug: au: Thompson, Christopher affil: Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Humanities, Social Sciences and Education, UiT - The Arctic University of Norway, Tromsø, Norway su: Moral agent (Philosophy) Groups Responsibility Moral attitudes Philosophy of emotions sug: subj: Moral agent (Philosophy) Groups Responsibility Moral attitudes Philosophy of emotions ab: Christian List and Philip Pettit have recently developed a model of group agency on which an autonomous group agent can be formed, by deductive inference, from the beliefs and preferences of the individual group members. In this paper I raise doubts as to whether this type of group agent is a moral agent. The sentimentalist approach to moral responsibility sees a constitutive role for moral emotions, such as blame, guilt, and indignation, in our practices of attributing moral responsibility. These moral emotions are important for the alignment of moral understandings, and for valuing other members of the moral community. I argue that while the intentional objects of beliefs and preferences are propositions, the intentional objects of moral emotions are other agents. Because agents are not subject to rules of inference, we cannot generate group agent emotions—such as guilt—in the same way as we can generate group agent beliefs and preferences. And because the group agents lack moral emotions, we have reason to resist treating them as moral agents. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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