A Perfectionist Humean Constructivism.

In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume's metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual's valuing attitudes, h...

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Publicado en:Ethics Vol. 128; no. 3; pp. 574 - 603
Autor principal: Dorsey, Dale
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: University of Chicago Press Apr2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Constructivism (Philosophy)
        Normativity (Ethics)
        Kantian ethics
        Perfection & ethics
        Entailment (Logic)
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          Constructivism (Philosophy)
          Normativity (Ethics)
          Kantian ethics
          Perfection & ethics
          Entailment (Logic)
      ab: In this article, I articulate and explore a novel constructivist approach to metanormativity that is inspired by David Hume's metaesthetics. This view, which I call perfectionist Humean constructivism, rejects the claim that practical reasons are constructed by each individual's valuing attitudes, holding instead that they are constructed (in part) by humanity's shared evaluative nature. I hold that this approach can plausibly respond to a persistent worry for extant versions of Humean constructivism without embracing the commitments of either a Kantian constructivism or a metaphysically robust form of metanormative realism.
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