ENTRY DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES.
Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances. Using a structural econometric model, this paper examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing, a...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 1898 - 1925 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=129933577&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 129933577 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2018 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129933577 10.1111/ecin.12559 ppf: 1898 ppct: 27 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 304KB tig: atl: ENTRY DETERRENCE AND STRATEGIC ALLIANCES. aug: au: Gayle, Philip G. Xie, Xin affil: Professor, Department of Economics, Kansas State University, Manhattan, KS 66506 Assistant Professor, Department of Economics and Finance, East Tennessee State University, Johnson City, TN 37614 su: Market entry Airline rates Codeshare agreements Strategic alliances (Business) Incumbency (Public officers) sug: subj: Market entry Airline rates Codeshare agreements Strategic alliances (Business) Incumbency (Public officers) ab: Researchers have written extensively on the impact that strategic alliances between airlines have on airfare, but little is known of the market entry deterrent impact of strategic alliances. Using a structural econometric model, this paper examines the market entry deterrent impact of codesharing, a form of strategic alliance, between incumbent carriers in domestic air travel markets. We find evidence of market entry deterrence, but deterrence impact depends on the specific type of codesharing between market incumbents as well as the identity of the potential entrant. We quantify the extent to which market incumbents' codesharing influences potential entrants' market entry cost and probability of market entry. (JEL L13, L93) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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