PRIZE‐BASED MECHANISMS FOR FUND‐RAISING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS.
We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a setting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. We discuss equilibrium bidding in mechanisms that promote both conditional cooperation and competition (i.e., the lottery and the all‐pay auct...
| Published in: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 56; no. 3; pp. 1562 - 1585 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2018
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=129933587&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 129933587 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2018 vid: 56 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 129933587 10.1111/ecin.12570 ppf: 1562 ppct: 23 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 372KB tig: atl: PRIZE‐BASED MECHANISMS FOR FUND‐RAISING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS. aug: au: Damianov, Damian S. Peeters, Ronald affil: Durham University Business School, Mill Hill Lane, Durham, DH1 3LB, UK Department of Economics, University of Otago, P.O. Box 56, Dunedin, 9054, New Zealand su: Public goods Fundraising Optimal designs (Statistics) Lotteries Auctions sug: subj: Public goods Grantmaking Foundations Grant-making and giving services Other Gambling Industries Lotteries Fundraising Optimal designs (Statistics) Lotteries Auctions ab: We study the optimal design of mechanisms for the private provision of public goods in a setting in which donors compete for a prize of commonly known value. We discuss equilibrium bidding in mechanisms that promote both conditional cooperation and competition (i.e., the lottery and the all‐pay auction with the lowest‐bid payment rule) and rank their fund‐raising performance vis‐à‐vis their standard (pay‐your‐own‐bid) counterparts. The theoretically optimal mechanism in this model is the lowest‐price all‐pay auction—an auction in which the highest bidder wins the prize and all bidders pay the lowest bid. The highest amount for the public good is generated in the unique, symmetric, mixed‐strategy equilibrium of this auction. In the laboratory, the theoretically optimal mechanism generates the highest level of donations with three bidders but not with two bidders. (JEL D44, D64) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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