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IN DEFENSE OF BRAIN DEATH: REPLIES TO DON MARQUIS, MICHAEL NAIR-COLLINS, DOYEN NGUYEN, AND LAURA SPECKER SULLIVAN.

In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and id...

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Publicado en:Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy no. 55; pp. 68 - 91
Autor principal: Lizza, John P.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Diametros: An Online Journal of Philosophy Mar2018
Materias:
Brain death
Moral attitudes
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Brain death
        Moral attitudes
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          Brain death
          Moral attitudes
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        brain death
        death
        decapitation and death
        definition of death
        irreversibility and death
        organic integration
        persons and death
        social construction of death
      ab: In this paper, I defend brain death as a criterion for determining death against objections raised by Don Marquis, Michael Nair-Collins, Doyen Nguyen, and Laura Specker Sullivan. I argue that any definition of death for beings like us relies on some sortal concept by which we are individuated and identified and that the choice of that concept in a practical context is not determined by strictly biological considerations but involves metaphysical, moral, social, and cultural considerations. This view supports acceptance of a more pluralistic legal definition of death as well as acceptance of brain death as death.
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