Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation.
A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligibl...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Papers Vol. 47; no. 2; pp. 199 - 234 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=130443521&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 130443521 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 05568641 273E jtl: Philosophical Papers issn: 05568641 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2018 vid: 47 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 130443521 10.1080/05568641.2017.1422989 ppf: 199 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 308KB tig: atl: Learning, Acquired Dispositions and the Humean Theory of Motivation. aug: au: Douskos, Christos affil: Hellenic Open University University of Athens su: Motivation (Psychology) Cognitive learning sug: subj: Motivation (Psychology) Cognitive learning ab: A central point of contention in the ongoing debate between Humean and anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation concerns the theoretical credentials of the idea of mental states that are cognitive and motivational at the same time. Humeans claim that this idea is incoherent and thereby unintelligible (M. Smith, The Moral Problem, Blackwell 1994). I start by developing a linguistic argument against this claim. The semantics of certain ‘learning to’ and ‘knowing to’ ascriptions points to a dispositional state that has both motivational and cognitive properties: habitual knowledge, as we may call it. But there is nothing unintelligible or incoherent about such ascriptions as they figure in the explanation and assessment of action. This suggests that the idea of a state that has both cognitive and motivational properties is not an artefact of philosophical speculation. Moreover, I suggest that action explanations that appeal to habitual knowledge, which are a variety of habit explanation, present distinctive problems for Humean accounts. The discussion bears on the relationship between habitual knowledge and knowing-how, and its possible significance for anti-Humean accounts of moral motivation. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Papers is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Papers holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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