Obligation as Optimal Goal Satisfaction.
Formalising deontic concepts, such as obligation, prohibition and permission, is normally carried out in a modal logic with a possible world semantics, in which some worlds are better than others. The main focus in these logics is on inferring logical consequences, for example inferring that the obl...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Philosophical Logic Vol. 47; no. 4; pp. 579 - 610 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=130645739&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 130645739 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00223611 JPH jtl: Journal of Philosophical Logic issn: 00223611 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2018 vid: 47 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 130645739 10.1007/s10992-017-9440-3 ppf: 579 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 583KB tig: atl: Obligation as Optimal Goal Satisfaction. aug: au: Kowalski, Robert Satoh, Ken affil: Imperial College London, SW7 2AZ, Kensington, London, UK National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan su: Deontic logic Semantics Formalization (Philosophy) Satisfaction Logic programming sug: subj: Deontic logic Semantics Formalization (Philosophy) Satisfaction Logic programming keyword: Abductive logic programming Contrary-to-duty obligations Goals Normative conflicts Preferences ab: Formalising deontic concepts, such as obligation, prohibition and permission, is normally carried out in a modal logic with a possible world semantics, in which some worlds are better than others. The main focus in these logics is on inferring logical consequences, for example inferring that the obligation Oq is a logical consequence of the obligations Op and O (p → q). In this paper we propose a non-modal approach in which obligations are preferred ways of satisfying goals expressed in first-order logic. To say that p is obligatory, but may be violated, resulting in a less than ideal situation s, means that the task is to satisfy the goal p ∨ s, and that models in which p is true are preferred to models in which s is true. Whereas, in modal logic, the preference relation between possible worlds is part of the semantics of the logic, in this non-modal approach, the preference relation between first-order models is external to the logic. Although our main focus is on satisfying goals, we also formulate a notion of logical consequence, which is comparable to the notion of logical consequence in modal deontic logic. In this formalisation, an obligation Op is a logical consequence of goals G, when p is true in all best models of G. We show how this non-modal approach to the treatment of deontic concepts deals with problems of contrary-to-duty obligations and normative conflicts, and argue that the approach is useful for many other applications, including abductive explanations, defeasible reasoning, combinatorial optimisation, and reactive systems of the production system variety. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Journal of Philosophical Logic is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Journal of Philosophical Logic holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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