Retractions.
Intuitions about retractions have been used to motivate truth relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or personal taste claims. On MacFarlane’s prominent relativist proposal, sentences like “the ice cream might be in the freezer” or “Poc...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 195; no. 8; pp. 3335 - 3360 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=130861950&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 130861950 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2018 vid: 195 iid: 8 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 130861950 10.1007/s11229-015-0852-8 ppf: 3335 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 716KB tig: atl: Retractions. aug: au: Marques, Teresa affil: Law & Philosophy Group, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Edifici Roger de Lluria (Campus de la Ciutadella), C/ Trías Fargas, 25-27, 08005, Barcelona, Spain su: Contextualism (Philosophy) Relativity Modal logic Preferences (Philosophy) Material falsity sug: subj: Contextualism (Philosophy) Relativity Modal logic Preferences (Philosophy) Material falsity keyword: Contextualism Epistemic modals Predicates of personal taste Relativism Retraction ab: Intuitions about retractions have been used to motivate truth relativism about certain types of claims. Among these figure epistemic modals, knowledge attributions, or personal taste claims. On MacFarlane’s prominent relativist proposal, sentences like “the ice cream might be in the freezer” or “Pocoyo is funny” are only assigned a truth-value relative to contexts of utterance and contexts of assessment. Retractions play a crucial role in the argument for assessment-relativism. A retraction of a past assertion is supposed to be mandatory whenever the asserted sentence is not true at the context of use and the context of assessment. If retractions were not obligatory in these conditions, there would be no normative difference between assessment-relativism and contextualism. The main goal of this paper is to undermine the claim that retractions reveal this normative difference. To this effect, the paper offers a review of three important objections to the obligatoriness of retractions. Taken together, these objections make a strong case against the alleged support that retractions give to assessment-relativism. The objections are moreover supported by recent experimental results that are also discussed. This will satisfy a further goal, which is to undermine the idea that there is a constitutive retraction rule. The paper also discusses two ways to understand what such a rule would be constitutive of, and concludes with a discussion of how to describe what retractions are. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|