Attributing Agency to Automated Systems: Reflections on Human-Robot Collaborations and Responsibility-Loci.
Many ethicists writing about automated systems (e.g. self-driving cars and autonomous weapons systems) attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gap...
| Publicado en: | Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 1201 - 1220 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Aug2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=131259660&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 131259660 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13533452 GNI jtl: Science & Engineering Ethics issn: 13533452 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2018 vid: 24 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 131259660 10.1007/s11948-017-9943-x ppf: 1201 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 428KB tig: atl: Attributing Agency to Automated Systems: Reflections on Human-Robot Collaborations and Responsibility-Loci. aug: au: Nyholm, Sven affil: Eindhoven University of Technology, Eindhoven, The Netherlands su: Automatic control systems Automation Agent (Philosophy) Human-robot interaction Responsibility Ethics sug: subj: Automatic control systems Automation Agent (Philosophy) Human-robot interaction Responsibility Ethics keyword: Agency Human-robot collaboration Responsibility-gaps Responsibility-loci ab: Many ethicists writing about automated systems (e.g. self-driving cars and autonomous weapons systems) attribute agency to these systems. Not only that; they seemingly attribute an autonomous or independent form of agency to these machines. This leads some ethicists to worry about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps in cases where automated systems harm or kill human beings. In this paper, I consider what sorts of agency it makes sense to attribute to most current forms of automated systems, in particular automated cars and military robots. I argue that whereas it indeed makes sense to attribute different forms of fairly sophisticated agency to these machines, we ought not to regard them as acting on their own, independently of any human beings. Rather, the right way to understand the agency exercised by these machines is in terms of human-robot collaborations, where the humans involved initiate, supervise, and manage the agency of their robotic collaborators. This means, I argue, that there is much less room for justified worries about responsibility-gaps and retribution-gaps than many ethicists think. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Science & Engineering Ethics is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Science & Engineering Ethics holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|