Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience.
Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 175; no. 10; pp. 2447 - 2475 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Oct2018
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=131406089&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 131406089 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 175 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 131406089 10.1007/s11098-017-0968-4 ppf: 2447 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 544KB tig: atl: Experiencing organisms: from mineness to subject of experience. aug: au: Schlicht, Tobias affil: Institut für Philosophie II, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstr. 150, GA3/29, 44780, Bochum, Germany su: Consciousness Experience Cognitive science Phenomenology Metaphysics sug: subj: Consciousness Experience Cognitive science Phenomenology Metaphysics keyword: Embodied cognitive science Hume Kant Predictive coding Self Subjective character ab: Many philosophers hold that phenomenally conscious experiences involve a sense of mineness, since experiences like pain or hunger are immediately presented as mine. What can be said about this mineness, and does acceptance of this feature commit us to the existence of a subject or self? If yes, how should we characterize this subject? This paper considers the possibility that, (1) to the extent that we accept this feature, it provides us with a minimal notion of a subject of experience, and that (2) the phenomenological subject of experience, as it is represented in conscious experience, is the organism. While many philosophers agree that the metaphysical subject of experience is the animal, this claim is much less widespread, maybe even counterintuitive. The argument for this claim alludes to the structure of phenomenal consciousness and to recent work in cognitive science concerning the embodied character of consciousness and cognition. To illustrate the problems of current controversies, not only several recent rejections of a subject of experience are critically discussed, but also Hume’s famous rejection of a subject is criticized making use of epistemological aspects from Kant’s philosophy of mind. The final section situates the present discussion in the context of recently popular predictive coding accounts of perception and perceptual experience. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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