Strategic design under uncertain evaluations: structural analysis of design‐build auctions.
Abstract: I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design‐Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning...
| Publicado en: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 594 - 619 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Fall2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=131408120&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 131408120 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Fall2018 vid: 49 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 131408120 10.1111/1756-2171.12246 ppf: 594 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 631KB tig: atl: Strategic design under uncertain evaluations: structural analysis of design‐build auctions. aug: au: Takahashi, Hidenori affil: University of Mannheim su: Economic competition Design & build contracts Structural analysis (Engineering) Auctions Product design Pricing Bidders sug: subj: Economic competition Industrial Design Services Design & build contracts Structural analysis (Engineering) Auctions Product design Pricing Bidders ab: Abstract: I investigate firms' competition over price and product design under uncertain design evaluations in the context of Design‐Build (DB) auctions. Reviewers' design evaluations contain uncertainty from a bidder's perspective, leading luck to dampen differences in the firms' chances of winning. I model bidders' behavior and show semiparametric identification of the model primitives. Uncertain design evaluations increase the expected price of design quality and exacerbate an auctioneer's uncertainty in auction outcomes. These effects are mostly due to changes in bidding strategies. Bid ranking swaps due to uncertain evaluations account for a small share of these effects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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