Cross‐licensing and competition.

Abstract: We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 656 - 672
Autores principales: Jeon, Doh‐Shin, Lefouili, Yassine
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Fall2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Cross‐licensing and competition.
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        au:
          Jeon, Doh‐Shin
          Lefouili, Yassine
        affil: Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole
      su:
        Economic competition
        Monopoly capitalism
        License agreements
        Royalties (Copyright)
        Licensed products
        Antitrust law
      sug:
        subj:
          Economic competition
          Monopoly capitalism
          Lessors of Nonfinancial Intangible Assets (except Copyrighted Works)
          License agreements
          Royalties (Copyright)
          Licensed products
          Antitrust law
      ab: Abstract: We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross‐licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross‐licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross‐licensing agreements are derived.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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