The effect of entry on R&D networks.
Abstract: We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter e...
| Published in: | RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 49; no. 3; pp. 706 - 751 |
|---|---|
| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Fall2018
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=131408124&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 131408124 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 07416261 56RJ jtl: RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) issn: 07416261 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Fall2018 vid: 49 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 131408124 10.1111/1756-2171.12250 ppf: 706 ppct: 45 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.7MB tig: atl: The effect of entry on R&D networks. aug: au: Petrakis, Emmanuel Tsakas, Nikolas affil: University of Crete University of Cyprus su: Market entry Subsidies Welfare economics Research & development Business networks Profitability Market exit sug: subj: Market entry Subsidies Welfare economics Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology) Research and Development in Biotechnology Research & development Business networks Profitability Market exit ab: Abstract: We investigate the effect of potential entry on the formation and stability of R&D networks considering farsighted firms. The presence of a potential entrant often alters the incentives of incumbents to collaborate. Incumbent firms may form an otherwise undesirable collaboration to deter entry of a new firm. Moreover, an incumbent may refrain from establishing an otherwise desirable collaboration, expecting to form a more profitable link with the entrant. Finally, potential entry may lead an inefficient incumbent to exit the market. Welfare analysis shows market and social incentives to be often misaligned. We propose a subsidy scheme that encourages welfare‐improving entry. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|