LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES.
Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand el...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 56; no. 4; pp. 2027 - 2058 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=131499404&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 131499404 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 56 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 131499404 10.1111/ecin.12692 ppf: 2027 ppct: 31 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.1MB tig: atl: LOBBYING FOR MINIMUM WAGES. aug: au: Lesica, Josip affil: Department of Economics, McMaster University, Hamilton, ON, L8S 4M4, Canada su: Income maintenance programs Living wage movement Government policy Wages Lobbying Minimum wage -- Government policy sug: subj: Income maintenance programs Living wage movement Government policy Wages Lobbying Public Relations Agencies Minimum wage -- Government policy ab: Using a common agency lobbying framework, this paper illustrates how the minimum wage set reflects the interaction between economic and political factors and under what circumstances will the policymaker be induced, through lobbying, to change the minimum wage. Specifically, when the labor demand elasticity is large, lobbying is successful in inducing the policymaker to set the minimum wage in accordance with her political ideology. However, the paper also shows the conditions under which lobbying will reverse the ideological preference and induce a business‐friendly government to increase the minimum wage. Empirical analysis on a panel data for ten Canadian provinces gives considerable support for theoretical predictions. The real minimum wage decreases in skill‐adjusted union density and political ideology, while larger labor demand elasticity reinforces the influence of political ideology in the presence of lobbying. (JEL J38, D72, D78) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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