The Error Is in the Gap: Synthesizing Accounts for Societal Values in Science.
Kevin Elliott and others separate two common arguments for the legitimacy of societal values in scientific reasoning as the gap and the error arguments (respectively, the arguments from underdetermination and from inductive risk). This article poses two questions: How are these two arguments related...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 85; no. 4; pp. 704 - 726 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Oct2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=131753991&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 131753991 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 85 iid: 4 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 131753991 10.1086/699191 ppf: 704 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 525KB tig: atl: The Error Is in the Gap: Synthesizing Accounts for Societal Values in Science. aug: au: ChoGlueck, Christopher su: Science & society Social perception Ethics Errors Reasoning Philosophers sug: subj: Science & society Social perception Ethics Errors Reasoning Philosophers ab: Kevin Elliott and others separate two common arguments for the legitimacy of societal values in scientific reasoning as the gap and the error arguments (respectively, the arguments from underdetermination and from inductive risk). This article poses two questions: How are these two arguments related, and what can we learn from their interrelation? I contend that we can better understand the error argument as nested within the gap because the error is a limited case of the gap with narrower features. Furthermore, this nestedness provides philosophers with conceptual tools for analyzing more robustly how values pervade science. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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