Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief.
Abstract: This paper explores the nature of self‐knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self‐knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self‐knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is d...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26; no. 3; pp. 1086 - 1103 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Sep2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=131949104&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 131949104 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Sep2018 vid: 26 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 131949104 10.1111/ejop.12318 ppf: 1086 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 841KB tig: atl: Introspection, mindreading, and the transparency of belief. aug: au: Peters, Uwe affil: Centre for Logic and Analytic Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy, KU Leuven, Kardinaal Mercierplein 2, 3000, Leuven, Belgium Department of Economics, University College London, Gower St, Kings Cross, London, WC1E 6BT, UK su: Introspection Telepathy Theory of self-knowledge Belief & doubt Self-consciousness (Awareness) sug: subj: Introspection Telepathy Theory of self-knowledge Belief & doubt Self-consciousness (Awareness) ab: Abstract: This paper explores the nature of self‐knowledge of beliefs by investigating the relationship between self‐knowledge of beliefs and one's knowledge of other people's beliefs. It introduces and defends a new account of self‐knowledge of beliefs according to which this type of knowledge is developmentally interconnected with and dependent on resources already used for acquiring knowledge of other people's beliefs, which is inferential in nature. But when these resources are applied to oneself, one attains and subsequently frequently uses a method for acquiring knowledge of beliefs that is non‐inferential in nature. The paper argues that this account is preferable to some of the most common empirically motivated theories of self‐knowledge of beliefs and explains the origin of the widely discussed phenomenon that our own beliefs are often transparent to us in that we can determine whether we believe that p simply by settling whether p is the case. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|