Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence.
Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We i...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 85; no. 1; pp. 255 - 276 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=132003882&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 132003882 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2018 vid: 85 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132003882 10.1002/soej.12278 ppf: 255 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 275KB tig: atl: Why factors facilitating collusion may not predict cartel occurrence — experimental evidence. aug: au: Fonseca, Miguel A. Li, Yan Normann, Hans‐Theo su: International trade Economic competition Energy consumption Collusion Nash equilibrium sug: subj: International trade Economic competition Energy consumption International Trade Financing Collusion Nash equilibrium keyword: C70 C90 L42 C70 C90 L42 ab: Factors facilitating collusion may not successfully predict cartel occurrence: When a factor predicts that collusion (explicit and tacit) becomes easier, firms might be less inclined to set up a cartel simply because tacit coordination already tends to go in hand with supra‐competitive profits. We illustrate this issue with laboratory data. We run n‐firm Cournot experiments with written cheap‐talk communication between players and we compare them to treatments without the possibility to talk. We conduct this comparison for two, four, and six firms. We find that two firms indeed find it easier to collude tacitly but that the number of firms does not significantly affect outcomes with communication. As a result, the payoff gain from communication increases with the number of firms, at a decreasing rate. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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