SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE.
This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism's implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it's okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of 'ideally rati...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Issues Vol. 28; no. 1; pp. 107 - 129 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132532302&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 132532302 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 15336077 1731 jtl: Philosophical Issues issn: 15336077 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 28 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132532302 10.1111/phis.12118 ppf: 107 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 140KB tig: atl: SOLVING THE PROBLEM OF LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE. aug: au: Dogramaci, Sinan affil: The University of Texas at Austin su: Problem solving Computer hacking Certainty sug: subj: Problem solving Computer hacking Certainty ab: This paper looks at three ways of addressing probabilism's implausible requirement of logical omniscience. The first and most common strategy says it's okay to require an ideally rational person to be logically omniscient. I argue that this view is indefensible on any interpretation of 'ideally rational'. The second strategy says probabilism should be formulated not in terms of logically possible worlds but in terms of doxastically possible worlds, ways you think the world might be. I argue that, on the interpretation of this approach that lifts the requirement of certainty in all logical truths, the view becomes vacuous, issuing no requirements on rational believers at all. Finally, I develop and endorse a new solution to the problem. This view proposes dynamic norms for reasoning with credences. The solution is based on an old proposal of Ian Hacking's that says you're required to be sensitive to logical facts only when you know they are logical facts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Issues is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Issues holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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