Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience.
In this essay I defend a kind of nonnaturalist normative supervenience, grounded in the essences of things. Essentialist theories, in fact, give us the tools to treat the nexus of normative supervenience as a nexus of metaphysical necessity, holding between the normative and the natural. In this con...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 37; no. 4; pp. 631 - 644 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132814766&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 132814766 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2018 vid: 37 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 132814766 10.1007/s11245-017-9458-8 ppf: 631 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1MB tig: atl: Essentialism and Nonnaturalist Normative Supervenience. aug: au: Corradini, Antonella affil: Università Cattolica di Milano, Milan, Italy su: Essentialism (Philosophy) Naturalists Supervenience (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Naturalism sug: subj: Essentialism (Philosophy) Naturalists Supervenience (Philosophy) Normativity (Ethics) Naturalism keyword: Essentialist grounding Metaphysical necessity Normative nonnaturalism Normative supervenience ab: In this essay I defend a kind of nonnaturalist normative supervenience, grounded in the essences of things. Essentialist theories, in fact, give us the tools to treat the nexus of normative supervenience as a nexus of metaphysical necessity, holding between the normative and the natural. In this context, essentialist grounding provides an explanation of normative supervenience that allows us to keep together both supervenience and nonnaturalism. Moreover, to achieve this significant result, I do not make use of hybrid properties, which are both normative and natural. Rather, I endeavour to show that the notion of hybrid property is based on an erroneous notion of grounding. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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