Political Agency, Citizenship, and Non-human Animals.
In this essay I challenge the idea that political agency must be central to the concept of citizenship. I consider this question in relation to whether or not domesticated animals can be understood as our fellow citizens. In recent debates on this topic, both proponents and opponents of animal citiz...
| Publicado en: | Res Publica (13564765) Vol. 24; no. 4; pp. 509 - 531 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Nov2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132880925&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 132880925 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13564765 NMV jtl: Res Publica (13564765) issn: 13564765 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Nov2018 vid: 24 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 132880925 10.1007/s11158-017-9374-1 ppf: 509 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 425KB tig: atl: Political Agency, Citizenship, and Non-human Animals. aug: au: Hooley, Dan affil: University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada su: Citizenship Liberalism Democracy Constitutional law Domestic animals sug: subj: Citizenship Liberalism Democracy Constitutional law Domestic animals keyword: Animals Political agency ab: In this essay I challenge the idea that political agency must be central to the concept of citizenship. I consider this question in relation to whether or not domesticated animals can be understood as our fellow citizens. In recent debates on this topic, both proponents and opponents of animal citizenship have taken political agency to be central to this question. I advance two main arguments against this position. First, I argue against the orthodox view that claims political agency is a requirement of citizenship. This position ignores both how citizenship is understood in practice by modern, liberal democracies, as well as the separate functions of citizenship. Further, there are no plausible ways we can consistently extend citizenship to humans regardless of intellectual ability, while denying it to domesticated animals. Nevertheless, I argue that it is important to distinguish two ways in which citizenship is enacted: Citizenship as Membership and Citizenship as Responsible, Political Agent. Domesticated animals should be understood as citizens, despite the fact that they are not responsible, political agents. Second, I challenge the view, put forward by Donaldson and Kymlicka, that animals are capable of certain forms of political agency. I argue that political agency is not crucial to whether, and how, the preferences of these animals matter for political decision-making. The upshot of my argument is that political agency matters much less to debates about the citizenship of non-human animals than both sides of this debate have been inclined to think. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Res Publica (13564765) is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Res Publica (13564765) holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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