No Such Thing as Killer Robots.
There have been two recent strands of argument (one offered by Rob Sparrow and the other offered by Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser) arguing for the pro tanto impermissibility of fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS). On Sparrow's view, AWS are impermissible because they generate a...
| Publicado en: | Journal of Applied Philosophy Vol. 35; no. 4; pp. 705 - 718 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=132915651&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 132915651 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 02643758 BQ0 jtl: Journal of Applied Philosophy issn: 02643758 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2018 vid: 35 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132915651 10.1111/japp.12274 ppf: 705 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 92KB tig: atl: No Such Thing as Killer Robots. aug: au: Robillard, Michael affil: Uehiro Center for Practical Ethics, University of Oxford, 16‐17 St. Ebbes St. Oxford, OX1 1PT, UK su: Weapons systems Robotics Sparrow, Rob Decision making Computer programmers sug: subj: Weapons systems Robotics Sparrow, Rob Decision making Computer programmers ab: There have been two recent strands of argument (one offered by Rob Sparrow and the other offered by Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and Bradley Strawser) arguing for the pro tanto impermissibility of fully autonomous weapon systems (AWS). On Sparrow's view, AWS are impermissible because they generate a morally problematic 'responsibility gap'. According to Purves et al., AWS are impermissible because moral reasoning is not codifiable and because AWS are incapable of acting for the 'right' reasons. I contend that these arguments are flawed and that AWS are not morally problematic in principle. Specifically, I contend that these arguments presuppose an incoherent conception of an AWS as somehow making genuine decisions but not being morally responsible for those very same decisions. Rather than conceiving of AWS in this way, I argue that an AWS is either a socially‐constructed institution that has been physically instantiated or it is a genuine agent. If it is the former, then we should treat AWS as we do any other collective action problem. If it is the latter, then we should treat AWS as responsibility‐bearers, but also as bearers of rights and/or interests. To reject this disjunction is not only conceptually incoherent but also potentially morally dangerous. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Journal of Applied Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Journal of Applied Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|