ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVORS INSURANCE.
This article develops a heterogeneous agents model to analyze the effects of Social Security survivors insurance. The model features a negative mortality–income gradient, asymmetric information of individual mortality rates, and a warm‐glow bequest motive that varies by age and family structure. The...
| Publicado en: | International Economic Review Vol. 59; no. 4; pp. 2043 - 2074 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Nov2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=132990817&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 132990817 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00206598 IER jtl: International Economic Review issn: 00206598 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Nov2018 vid: 59 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 132990817 10.1111/iere.12329 ppf: 2043 ppct: 31 formats: tig: atl: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL SECURITY SURVIVORS INSURANCE. aug: au: Li, Yue affil: University at Albany, SUNY U.S.A. su: Social security Life insurance Insurance exchanges Economic research Financial management sug: subj: Social security Research and Development in the Social Sciences and Humanities All Other Insurance Related Activities Direct group life, health and medical insurance carriers Direct individual life, health and medical insurance carriers Direct Life Insurance Carriers Portfolio Management Life insurance Insurance exchanges Economic research Financial management ab: This article develops a heterogeneous agents model to analyze the effects of Social Security survivors insurance. The model features a negative mortality–income gradient, asymmetric information of individual mortality rates, and a warm‐glow bequest motive that varies by age and family structure. The model matches life‐cycle changes in life insurance coverage and generates advantageous selection in the insurance market. For male agents, reducing survivors benefits for dependent children generates welfare losses, whereas reducing survivors benefits for aged spouses produces welfare gains. The opposing welfare results are explained by differences in the timing of benefits and in the funding cost. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|