The Chain Effect of an Antidumping Policy.
This article uses a successive duopoly model to show that some antidumping retaliation may in fact be a chain effect of an antidumping policy. Findings present that if dumping initially takes place in the home country's final good market, then antidumping protection in the final good market will res...
| Publicado en: | Southern Economic Journal Vol. 85; no. 2; pp. 424 - 441 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Oct2018
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=133013146&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 133013146 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00384038 SEJ jtl: Southern Economic Journal issn: 00384038 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 85 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 133013146 10.1002/soej.12276 ppf: 424 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 221KB tig: atl: The Chain Effect of an Antidumping Policy. aug: au: Kao, Kuo‐Feng Mai, Chao‐Cheng su: Economic competition Dumping (International trade) Lex talionis Duopolies Antidumping duty laws sug: subj: Economic competition Dumping (International trade) Lex talionis Duopolies Antidumping duty laws keyword: F13 F13 ab: This article uses a successive duopoly model to show that some antidumping retaliation may in fact be a chain effect of an antidumping policy. Findings present that if dumping initially takes place in the home country's final good market, then antidumping protection in the final good market will result in dumping in the foreign country's input market, thus leading to further antidumping protection, which will reinforce the incentive of the home downstream firm to initially petition for antidumping protection. Moreover, we demonstrate that an antidumping duty in vertically related markets may not provide this industry with adequate protection. Finally, when taking the antidumping chain effect into account, we show that the government which initially faces the dumping may determine a higher antidumping duty if the production inefficiency of the home upstream firm relative to the foreign upstream firm is in the medium range. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|