An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition.

The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 195; no. 12; pp. 5245 - 5270
Autor principal: Wajnerman Paz, Abel
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1007/s11229-018-1815-7
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        atl: An efficient coding approach to the debate on grounded cognition.
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        au: Wajnerman Paz, Abel
        affil: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Instituto de Filosofía, Office 431, 4th floor, Puán 480, 1406, Buenos Aires, Capital Federal, Argentina
      su:
        Concepts
        Cognition
        Computational neuroscience
        Neural codes
        Debate
      sug:
        subj:
          Concepts
          Cognition
          Computational neuroscience
          Neural codes
          Debate
      keyword:
        Efficient coding
        Format
        Grounded cognition
      ab: The debate between the amodal and the grounded views of cognition seems to be stuck. Their only substantial disagreement is about the vehicle or format of concepts. Amodal theorists reject the grounded claim that concepts are couched in the same modality-specific format as representations in sensory systems. The problem is that there is no clear characterization of (modal or amodal) format or its neural correlate. In order to make the disagreement empirically meaningful and move forward in the discussion we need a neurocognitive criterion for representational format. I argue that efficient coding models in computational neuroscience can be used to characterize modal codes: These are codes which satisfy special informational demands imposed by sensory tasks. Additionally, I examine recent studies on neural coding and argue that although they do not provide conclusive evidence for either the grounded or the amodal views, they can be used to determine what predictions these approaches can make and what experimental and theoretical developments would be required to settle the debate.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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