Mathematical Explanations that are Not Proofs.

Explanation in mathematics has recently attracted increased attention from philosophers. The central issue is taken to be how to distinguish between two types of mathematical proofs: those that explain why what they prove is true and those that merely prove theorems without explaining why they are t...

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Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 83; no. 6; pp. 1285 - 1303
Autor principal: Lange, Marc
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Dec2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Mathematical Explanations that are Not Proofs.
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        au: Lange, Marc
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of North Carolina, CB#3125, 27599-3125, Chapel Hill, NC, USA
      su:
        Mathematical proofs
        Reasoning
        Mathematics theorems
        Probability theory
        Mathematicians
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          Mathematical proofs
          Reasoning
          Mathematics theorems
          Probability theory
          Mathematicians
      ab: Explanation in mathematics has recently attracted increased attention from philosophers. The central issue is taken to be how to distinguish between two types of mathematical proofs: those that explain why what they prove is true and those that merely prove theorems without explaining why they are true. This way of framing the issue neglects the possibility of mathematical explanations that are not proofs at all. This paper addresses what it would take for a non-proof to explain. The paper focuses on a particular example of an explanatory non-proof: an argument that mathematicians regard as explaining why a given theorem holds regarding the derivative of an infinite sum of differentiable functions. The paper contrasts this explanatory non-proof with various non-explanatory proofs (and non-explanatory nonproofs) of the same theorem. The paper offers an account of what makes the given non-proof explanatory. This account is motivated by investigating the difficulties that arise when we try to extend Mark Steiner’s influential account of explanatory proofs to cover this explanatory non-proof.
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    language: English
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