Finean essence, local necessity, and pure logical properties.

Since Kit Fine published his famous counter-examples to the modal account of essence, numerous modalists have proposed to avoid the counter-examples by revising the modal account. A sophisticated revision has been put forward by Fabrice Correia. Drawing on themes from Prior’s modality, Correia has i...

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Publicado en:Synthese Vol. 195; no. 11; pp. 4997 - 5006
Autor principal: Morvarid, Hashem
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Nov2018
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Finean essence, local necessity, and pure logical properties.
      aug:
        au: Morvarid, Hashem
        affil: School of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran
      su:
        Sabellianism
        Metaphysics
        Intuition
        Fine, Kit
        Correia, Fabrice
      sug:
        subj:
          Sabellianism
          Metaphysics
          Intuition
          Fine, Kit
          Correia, Fabrice
      keyword:
        Essence
        Local necessity
        Modality
        Pure logical properties
      ab: Since Kit Fine published his famous counter-examples to the modal account of essence, numerous modalists have proposed to avoid the counter-examples by revising the modal account. A sophisticated revision has been put forward by Fabrice Correia. Drawing on themes from Prior’s modality, Correia has introduced a nonstandard conception of metaphysical modality and has proposed to analyze essence in its terms. He has claimed that the analysis is immune to Fine’s counter-examples. In this paper, I argue that there are counter-examples supported by the very intuition underlying Fine’s counter-examples, which are not accommodated by Correia’s account. If my argument is sound, then Correia has not been successful in his defense of modalism. An important corollary of my argument will be that Fine’s consequential conception of essence needs to be modified if it is to capture his own intuitive notion of essence.
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    language: English
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