True lies.
A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preco...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 195; no. 10; pp. 4581 - 4616 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Oct2018
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=133269576&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 133269576 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Oct2018 vid: 195 iid: 10 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 133269576 10.1007/s11229-017-1423-y ppf: 4581 ppct: 35 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 670KB tig: atl: True lies. aug: au: Ågotnes, Thomas van Ditmarsch, Hans Wang, Yanjing affil: Information Science and Media Studies, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway Center for the Study of Language and Cognition, Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China LORIA - CNRS/University of Lorraine, Nancy, France Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing, China su: Truth Logic Theory of knowledge Semantics Truthfulness & falsehood sug: subj: Truth Logic Theory of knowledge Semantics Truthfulness & falsehood ab: A true lie is a lie that becomes true when announced. In a logic of announcements, where the announcing agent is not modelled, a true lie is a formula (that is false and) that becomes true when announced. We investigate true lies and other types of interaction between announced formulas, their preconditions and their postconditions, in the setting of Gerbrandy’s logic of believed announcements, wherein agents may have or obtain incorrect beliefs. Our results are on the satisfiability and validity of instantiations of these semantically defined categories, on iterated announcements, including arbitrarily often iterated announcements, and on syntactic characterization. We close with results for iterated announcements in the logic of knowledge (instead of belief), and for lying as private announcements (instead of public announcements) to different agents. Detailed examples illustrate our lying concepts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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