BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT.
We present a novel microstructure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether—depending on the other clubs' bids—a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, w...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 57; no. 1; pp. 85 - 103 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=133389541&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 133389541 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 57 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 133389541 10.1111/ecin.12712 ppf: 85 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 256KB tig: atl: BIDDING FOR TALENT IN SPORT. aug: au: Burguet, Roberto Sákovics, József affil: Associate Professor, College of Business, University of Central Florida, Orlando FL, 32816. Professor, School of Economics, The University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh EH8 9JT, UK. su: Revenue sharing in sports Nash equilibrium Bids Bidding strategies Willingness to pay Sports teams sug: subj: Sports Teams and Clubs Revenue sharing in sports Nash equilibrium Bids Bidding strategies Willingness to pay Sports teams ab: We present a novel microstructure for the market for athletes. Clubs simultaneously target bids at the players, in (Nash) equilibrium internalizing whether—depending on the other clubs' bids—a player not hired would play for the competition. When talent is either scarce or has low outside options, we support—and generalize to heterogeneous players—the Coasian results of Rottenberg (1956) and Fort and Quirk (1995): talent allocation is efficient and independent of initial "ownership" and revenue sharing arrangements. We also characterize equilibria when talent is abundant (or has a high outside option). The analysis uses a nonspecific club objective with an endogenously derived trade‐off between pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits.(JEL J4, L1, L2) pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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