Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas.

An important part of Hume's philosophy is grounded in a fundamental distinction between two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas. Existing views of the distinction are that the former are livelier than the latter, that the former are causally prior to the latter, that the latter are copies of...

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Publicado en:European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 26; no. 4; pp. 1222 - 1238
Autor principal: Rickless, Samuel C.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Dec2018
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas.
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        au: Rickless, Samuel C.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla CA, USA
      su:
        Idea (Philosophy)
        Hume, Basil, 1923-1999
        Sensory perception
        Theory of self-knowledge
        Thought & thinking
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          Idea (Philosophy)
          Hume, Basil, 1923-1999
          Sensory perception
          Theory of self-knowledge
          Thought & thinking
      ab: An important part of Hume's philosophy is grounded in a fundamental distinction between two kinds of perceptions: impressions and ideas. Existing views of the distinction are that the former are livelier than the latter, that the former are causally prior to the latter, that the latter are copies of the former, that the former but not the latter are perceptions of an objective realm, and that the former are feelings whereas the latter are thoughts. I argue that all of these views of the distinction are problematic and should be replaced by the Reflection view, according to which (simple) ideas are, while impressions are not, the direct products of reflection on other perceptions.
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