Mos Geometricus and the Common Law Mind: Interrogating Contract Theory.
Euclidian theories have it that there exist one or a small number of apex principles from which the entire fasciculus of rules of contract law can be logically deduced. Two arguments are marshalled against the Euclidian project. First, that it has been unsuccessfully attempted before – in the form o...
| Publicado en: | Modern Law Review Vol. 82; no. 1; pp. 46 - 71 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jan2019
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=133923818&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 133923818 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00267961 D8H jtl: Modern Law Review issn: 00267961 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 82 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 133923818 10.1111/1468-2230.12388 ppf: 46 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 227KB tig: atl: Mos Geometricus and the Common Law Mind: Interrogating Contract Theory. aug: au: Swaminathan, Shivprasad su: Common law Contract theory Civil law Rationalism Euclidean algorithm sug: subj: Common law Contract theory Civil law Rationalism Euclidean algorithm keyword: civil law common law Euclidian theory legal treatise rationalism will theory ab: Euclidian theories have it that there exist one or a small number of apex principles from which the entire fasciculus of rules of contract law can be logically deduced. Two arguments are marshalled against the Euclidian project. First, that it has been unsuccessfully attempted before – in the form of the nineteenth century contract law treatise which emulated the civil lawyer's rationalistic model, mos geometricus – cautioning us against setting much store by its present reincarnation. Second, that the common law's methodology makes it resistant to this form of theorising. Euclidian theory presupposes a picture of rules on which: a) cases involve an application of logically prior rules; b) rules are reliably identifiable by different actors in the legal system; and c) rules normatively range over an indefinite spectrum of future cases. It will be argued that the common law defies this picture of rules thus rendering Euclidian theory analytically impossible. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Modern Law Review is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Modern Law Review holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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