Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists.
Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? One common response to this challenge proposes a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissi...
| Publicado en: | Ethical Theory & Moral Practice Vol. 21; no. 3; pp. 505 - 521 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2018
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134039490&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134039490 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13862820 OEY jtl: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice issn: 13862820 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2018 vid: 21 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 134039490 10.1007/s10677-018-9924-4 ppf: 505 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 469KB tig: atl: Moral Uncertainty for Deontologists. aug: au: Tarsney, Christian affil: Global Priorities Institute, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Oxford, 16/17 St Ebbe's Street, OX1 1PT, Oxford, United Kingdom su: Deontological ethics Normativity (Ethics) Agglomeration (Materials) Decision making Uncertainty sug: subj: Deontological ethics Normativity (Ethics) Agglomeration (Materials) Decision making Uncertainty keyword: Absolutism Decision theory Deontological decision theory Deontology Moral uncertainty Normative uncertainty Stochastic dominance ab: Defenders of deontological constraints in normative ethics face a challenge: how should an agent decide what to do when she is uncertain whether some course of action would violate a constraint? One common response to this challenge proposes a threshold principle on which it is subjectively permissible to act iff the agent's credence that her action would be constraint-violating is below some threshold t. But the threshold approach seems arbitrary and unmotivated: where does the threshold come from, and why should it take any one value rather than another? Threshold views also seem to violate "ought" agglomeration, since a pair of actions each of which is below the threshold for acceptable moral risk can, in combination, exceed that threshold. In this paper, I argue that stochastic dominance reasoning can vindicate and lend rigor to the threshold approach: given characteristically deontological assumptions about the moral value of acts, it turns out that morally safe options will stochastically dominate morally risky alternatives when and only when the likelihood that the risky option violates a moral constraint is greater than some precisely definable threshold (in the simplest case,.5). The stochastic dominance approach also allows a principled, albeit intuitively imperfect, response to the agglomeration problem. Thus, I argue, deontologists are better equipped than many critics have supposed to address the problems of decision-making under uncertainty. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice is a copyright of Springer, 2018. All Rights Reserved. item: Ethical Theory & Moral Practice holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2018 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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