Diversity, Ability, and Expertise in Epistemic Communities.
The Hong and Page 'diversity trumps ability' result has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts. Here we extend Hong and Page's model to landscapes of different degrees of randomness and demonstrate the sen...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 86; no. 1; pp. 98 - 124 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Jan2019
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=134147255&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 134147255 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jan2019 vid: 86 iid: 1 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 134147255 10.1086/701070 ppf: 98 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 2.3MB tig: atl: Diversity, Ability, and Expertise in Epistemic Communities. aug: au: Grim, Patrick Singer, Daniel J. Bramson, Aaron Holman, Bennett McGeehan, Sean Berger, William J. su: Ability Epistemic logic Heuristic Modal logic Heuristic algorithms sug: subj: Ability Epistemic logic Heuristic Modal logic Heuristic algorithms ab: The Hong and Page 'diversity trumps ability' result has been used to argue for the more general claim that a diverse set of agents is epistemically superior to a comparable group of experts. Here we extend Hong and Page's model to landscapes of different degrees of randomness and demonstrate the sensitivity of the 'diversity trumps ability' result. This analysis offers a more nuanced picture of how diversity, ability, and expertise may relate. Although models of this sort can indeed be suggestive for diversity policies, we advise against interpreting such results overly broadly. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2019 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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